INTRODUCTION
T he goal of this paper is to consider the adjustment of expected inflation in Canada to the disinflationary policies followed by the Bank of Canada between 1988 and 1995. Expected inflation is measured using the survey of professional forecasters published by the Conference Board of Canada. The paper documents carefully that actual inflation was substantially less than expected inflation over much of this period. The second goal of this paper is to measure the impact of three specific policy announcements on expected inflation. Did the signals sent by the Bank of Canada designed to reduce expected inflation actually reduce expected inflation?
The first signal was a series of speeches. On 18 January 1988 Governor John Crow (1988a) announced that getting monetary policy right meant "pursuing a policy aimed at achieving and maintaining price stability." On 5-6 May 1988, Governor Crow (1988b) restated that "monetary policy can best contribute to domestic economic progress...by seeking to achieve and maintain a stable general price level." On 4 June 1988 Governor Crow (1988c) stressed the goal of "stability in the general level of prices." However these speeches did not clearly define price stability nor give a timetable for its achievement. Laidler and Robson (1993, pp. 111-21) argue that these policy speeches were not explicit enough to shift expectations. This hypothesis is tested in this paper. The results indicate that over the period when these speeches were made expected inflation fell in a manner not explained by other known factors.
The second signal was a policy announcement made 26 February 1991 (Bank of Canada 1991 . For the first time in the history of Canadian monetary policy the Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance issued a joint policy announcement. The joint announcement defined price stability clearly as "core" inflation of less than 2 percent per year. The announcement also laid out a timetable for the achievement of price stability. The timetable set targets for "core" Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation of 3 percent during 1992, 2.5 percent from mid-1993 to mid-1994, and inflation of 2 percent during 1995. The announcement included the comment that there would be "further progress" toward price stability after 1995. Freedman (1994) argues that the targets were put in place partly to reduce expected inflation, to quote, "it was becoming apparent that this general commitment to price stability was not having the desired effect on inflation expectations." The empirical results indicate that the targets for inflation did not have a strong effect on expected inflation as measured by the survey. However survey measures of expected inflation are clearly within the target ranges. The inflation targets pass a simple test of credibility.
The third signal was an announcement on 22 December 1993 (Bank of Canada 1993) specifying both that Governor Crow would be replaced by Governor Theissen and that the inflation targets would be revised. The target rate of inflation in the "core" Consumer Price Index was to lie in a band between 1 percent and 3 percent with a midpoint of 2 percent for the period between 1995 and 1998. This extended the 2 percent target for inflation beyond the 1995 date specified in the 1991 announcement and delayed the further reduction in inflation suggested in the 1991 announcement. The December 1993 announcement also included the statement that a decision will be made by 1998 on a target range for CPI inflation that would be consistent with price stability. The empirical results indicate that when the December 1993 announcement occurred the level of expected inflation did fall slightly for reasons not explained by known factors in the economy. This is mildly puzzling. At the surface the December 1993 announcement appears to weaken the February 1991 commitment toward inflation of less than 2 percent. However the empirical results suggest that the Bank of Canada handled the transition to the new governor in such a way as to further reduce expected inflation.
The paper proceeds as follows. There is a brief discussion on the need to study expected inflation and an even briefer review of the large literature that already exists in this area. The nature of the available survey data is then discussed. The unexpected nature of the disinflation after 1988 is documented. Finally a framework is presented in which seven measures of expected inflation or the expected change in inflation are searched, holding other factors constant, for the effects of the three policy announcements. A brief conclusion follows.
decides to reduce the steady-state rate of inflation (disinflate) such an action is accompanied by an increase in unemployment. Ball (1994) finds that in 27 of 28 OECD countries between 1960 and 1993 disinflations are accompanied by recessions. 2 Cozier and Wilkinson (1991) document the Canadian experience of disinflation. Given the costs to society of recessions, it is important to ask if clear policy announcements or the announcement of targets can generate a more rapid reduction in expected inflation and a less severe recession.
The adjustment of expected inflation is closely linked to the literature on the need for credible monetary policy. The theoretical literature follows the contributions of Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) and is summarized in surveys by Blackburn and Christenson (1989) and Persson (1988) . In this literature the monetary authority is playing a game with the agents in the economy, the key to a lower rate of inflation at the same level of output is a credible policy to commit to a low rate of inflation. These models compare steady-states and say relatively little about the process of moving from a high inflation steady-state to a low inflation steady-state. Nonetheless much policy discussion and certainly the establishment of inflation targets has been viewed in the Barro-Gordon framework as a commitment by the monetary authority which can yield a lower actual and expected inflation rate. This paper asks if such commitments could also yield a more rapid adjustment of expected inflation in the transition.
The Bank of Canada, see Laxton, Ricketts and Rose (1994) or Ricketts and Rose (1995) , has used Markov switching models of the actual inflation process to identify the probability that agents in the economy will perceive the inflation process is in a low inflation rather than a high inflation state. If the probability of the low inflation state approaches one then commitment is achieved. This is a useful approach and produces measures of expected inflation which closely track the survey data I use. The Markov results indicate that there can be a slow transition to commitment as agents confirm the economy is actually in the low inflation state. This is comparable to the result in my paper. The Markov approach reveals that disinflation was unexpected after 1988 and the announcements are only partly successful in shifting expected inflation.
Survey data has not been often used to assess the ability of policy announcements to affect expected inflation. 3 Croushore and Koot (1994) conclude that Federal Reserve policy was credible because internal (but not public) Federal Reserve forecasts were consistent with both actual inflation and private sector expectations of inflation. Ball and Croushore (1995) ask if the public stance of Federal Reserve policy shifts expectations, as measured by survey data, "enough" in the direction of actual changes in inflation. They conclude that the answer is "not enough" and that Federal Reserve policy is not credible by this measure. This is similar to the flavour of the results in my paper, two of the three Canadian policy announcements do shift expectations but not "enough" to avoid an unexpected disinflation. There is some non-North American use of survey data to assess policy. Batchelor and Orr (1991) find that the variability in surveys of expected inflation in the United Kingdom is associated with the party in power in the United Kingdom. Fischer and Orr (1994) argue inflation targets in New Zealand reduced uncertainty in inflation.
THE SURVEY DATA
The Conference Board of Canada has surveyed professional forecasters since 1975. 4 Forecasters are asked for a prediction of the rate of increase of both the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator and the Consumer Price Index over the current calendar year and the next calendar year. Between 1975 Between and 1979 Between and in 1981 there is one survey each year in July. In 1980 and 1982 there are two surveys. After 1982, there are four surveys in each year, one after each release of the quarterly National Accounts. The goal of the Conference Board survey is to allow forecasters to update their forecasts after the most recent quarterly release of the National Accounts. 5 In my use of the data, forecasters are not identified by name. 6 Thus the data are not used as a panel. There are between 8 and 17 respondents at each time.
The survey asks respondents for expected inflation during the current calendar year and over the next calendar year. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the data for the Consumer Price Index and the GDP deflator respectively. Figures 1 and 2 correspond to Tables 1 and 2 . The tables present average forecasts and standard deviations over all forecasts in each calendar year. Actual inflation relevant to that forecast is included. In addition the average forecast error and standard deviation of the forecast errors for the first forecast of each calendar year is presented. The forecast error is calculated as forecast minus actual inflation. The forecasters pass the minimum test for rationality of expectations; average forecast errors over the full sample of first-of-year forecasts, listed at the bottom of Table 1 and Table  2 are not significantly different from zero. 7 It is important to consider only the errors from first-ofyear forecasts to calculate the standard deviations correctly. Forecasters learn during the current year more about actual inflation during the current year and more information relevant to inflation in the next calendar year. Thus not all observations in the year can be treated equally and standard errors estimated from the full sample will be too small as information accumulates. 8 The information set for first-ofyear forecasts before 1982 is slightly larger than the information set after 1982 because in the earlier period the first forecast was in July. The tables do show some decline in the variability of forecasts and forecast errors as actual inflation fell throughout the period studied. The decline is quite striking for forecasts made for the next calendar year.
A DIRECT LOOK AT THE EXTENT OF UNEXPECTED DISINFLATION AND THE CREDIBILITY OF TARGETS Three lessons are learned looking directly at the data. First, the disinflation in the early 1990s was unexpected. The announcements did not avoid unexpected disinflation. Second, there is interesting evidence that the attempt by the Bank of Canada to clarify policy did result in a shorter period and a slightly smaller magnitude of unexpected disinflation relative to the early 1980s. Third, expected inflation fell to within the range of the targets. This is direct evidence that the targets were credible. Tables 1 and 2 and the corresponding figures show quite clearly that the disinflation was unexpected in the years after 1988. This discussion focuses on averages and standard deviations in the errors of first-of-year forecasts. Current-year unexpected disinflation was statistically different from zero in 1992 and 1994 in Table 1 and 1990 and 1991 in Table 2 . The amount of unexpected disinflation is of economic significance, more than 1 percent. If first-of-current-year forecasts are used to calculate unexpected disinflation in the next calendar year unexpected disinflation is significantly different from zero for CPI inflation (Table 1) forecasts made in 1991, 1992, and 1993 . The last year is readily explained by the unexpected tobacco tax cut in 1994. Using the deflator forecasts next-year forecast errors are significantly greater than zero for forecasts made in 1989 through 1993.
It is useful to compare the disinflation following the 1982 recession to the disinflation following the 1990 recession. Unexpected current-year disinflation in 1990 is similar in magnitude to unexpected current-year disinflation in 1982 when measured using the GDP deflator. However currentyear unexpected disinflation after and including 1982 persists for five years at a statistically significant level whereas current-year forecasts of inflation are too high for only two years after 1990. Using Expected Inflation in Canada 1988 Canada -1995 consumer prices only 1992 and 1994 have a statistically significant current-year forecast error (1994 is the year of the unexpected tobacco tax cut). There are no statistically significant current-year forecast errors using consumer prices following the 1982 disinflation. For the deflator measure next-year forecast errors persist for five years with statistical significance for both disinflations; for the CPI nextyear forecast errors persist for three years. There is some evidence that Bank of Canada policy announcements reduced the magnitude of unexpected disinflation after 1990. Using the deflator measure in the five years after 1981 next-year forecast errors average 2.7 percent and in the five years after 1989 next-year forecast errors average 1.8 percent.
The clarification of policy after 1988 may have reduced the magnitude of unexpected disinflation. The numbers are less overwhelming for CPI inflation: the average next-year forecast error over three years 1982-84 is 2.19 percent, in the three years 1991-1993 the average is 1.98 percent but the latter period includes the unexpected tobacco tax cut relevant to the 1993 next-year forecast. The conventional wisdom is that after 1988 the Bank of Canada tried much harder to signal its intentions about inflation than it did in 1982. While it is clear these signals did not reduce expectational errors to zero, the comparison of the post-1982 period and the post-1991 period indicates these signals had some success. Table 1 also presents direct evidence on the credibility of Bank of Canada targets. As of February 1991, the Consumer Price Index target for inflation by the end of 1992 was 3 percent, 2 and one-half percent by mid-1994 and 2 percent by 1995. In each case there was a 1 percent band around the target. Although the correspondence between the calendar year dates of the forecasters and the dates of the targets may not be perfect, Table 1 makes it clear that average forecasts both first-of-year and over the whole calendar year fall within the bands at all times. The targets pass this simplest test of credibility. The next task is to measure directly the extent to which the policy signals did change expected inflation. Such a measurement can only occur conditional on measurement of movements in expected inflation that would have taken place in the absence of announcements. Control variables include the state of the economy and actual policy changes already made.
MODELLING EXPECTED INFLATION
The goal of the policy announcements was to lower the expected rate of inflation. It is interesting to ask if these announcements had any effect. The statistical model used to answer that question takes into account the effect of three kinds of variables on expected inflation: past actual inflation and the difference between recent forecasts and recently observed inflation; policy actions already taken prior to the formation of expectations; and the known state of the real economy. After these effects are taken into account, a reduction in expected inflation occurring at the same time as the announcement but not accounted for by these other variables is attributed to the announcement. 9 The level of expected inflation (or the change in expected inflation between the most recently observed past and the immediate future) believed by forecaster "i" at time t is written EXPINF i,t (DEXPINF i,t ). The model estimated is:
(1) LAGGED t-j + B 2 RECENT FORECAST DIFFERENCE t-1 + B 3 BANKRATE t + B 4 EXCHANGE RATE t + B 5 SPREAD t + B 6 SLOPE t + B 7 UNEMPLOYMENT t-1 + A ANNOUNCE where the effect of the policy announcement is measured by the coefficient "A" on the dummy variable ANNOUNCE after the effect of the other variables has been taken into account. The INFLATION LAGGED variables represent the recent known history of the inflation process, RECENT FORECAST DIFFERENCE t-1 is the difference between the most recent average forecast and the most recently observed actual rate of inflation. 10 The construction of these variables carefully takes into account the lags in the availability of price information already discussed. BANKRATE is the average known nominal bank rate over the previous 12 months, intended to allow forecasters to incorporate the effect of the current stance of monetary policy on expected inflation. 11 EXCHANGE RATE is the most recent known 12-month percent change in the exchange rate. SPREAD is the average difference between Canadian and American interest rates over the previous 12 months. SLOPE is the average slope of the term structure over the last 12 months, expressed as long rates minus short rates. 12 The interest rate and exchange rate variables may also measure the anticipated effects of the current stance of monetary policy on the real economy in the future and thus on expected inflation. Finally the known change in the average unemployment rate between the last 12 months and the previous 12 months, the variable UNEMPLOYMENT, is included in the regressions to take into account the knowledge of forecasters concerning the state of the real economy. 13 This variable also captures the effects of past monetary policy. If the economy is or has been in a recession for some time, forecasters would expect inflation to decline regardless of the most recent policy announcement. Details on the definition and construction of each variable in the regression is found in the Data Appendix.
It is necessary to be clear about the samples used in the estimation of equation (1) and the role of the dummy variables. To consider the effects of each policy announcement the sample is the set of individual forecasts beginning in 1975 and ending either two or three forecasts after the announcement of interest. To estimate the coefficient on AN-NOUNCE after the 1988 speeches the sample ends with the individual forecasts made in July 1988. The dummy variables associated with forecasts made in March 1988 and July 1988 allow shifts in the intercept of the model for forecasts made in those quarters. These shifts are shifts in the level of expected inflation (or its change) for March 1988 and July 1988 forecasts. These shifts are relative to changes in the forecasts that would have taken place anyhow given the historical relationships between information variables and forecasts before March 1988 and any changes in those information variables. For example, if an increase in the bank rate before March 1988 already predicted a decline in forecasts of inflation as monetary policy tightened, the coefficient on the dummy variable asks how much extra impact did the announcement have in that quarter. The estimation by Ordinary Least Squares does not allow the announcement to change the coefficients on the relationships between forecasts and information variables in equation (1). Such coefficients might have changed, but with only two quarters of data and ten forecasts in each quarter, there is not very much new data to try and discern such an effect. The analysis does not try to determine if the announcement changed the relationships between forecasts and any of the variables in the information set. Interpretation of the dummy variables does depend on holding constant the coefficients relating forecasts to information variables at their historical relationships just before each announcement. However it is important that in the analysis of the 1991 target announcement, when the sample is extended to January 1992, there is some opportunity for the coefficients on the historical relationships between forecasts and information variables to change as the sample is increased. This occurs again in the analysis of the 1993 announcement. But each time the method only captures changes in the intercept for each of the particular announcements considered. The reader needs to judge whether this methodology using the dummy variables on intercepts only is sufficient to capture announcement effects accurately.
It is also crucial that the speeches in 1988 and the other announcements are treated as surprises. If the past information variables somehow predict that the Bank of Canada would have announced the price stability goal in 1988 or the introduction of targets in 1991 or the replacement of John Crow in 1993, and the forecasters correctly anticipate the Expected Inflation in Canada 1988 Canada -1995 announcements based on prior information, then their post-announcement forecasts would not change and the inference based on the coefficients on the dummy variables is fragile. If the announcements were perfectly anticipated, then none of the coefficients on the dummy variables need be significant. It is extremely important to stress that the residuals in this regression are not forecast errors. These residuals are not the difference between actual and expected inflation. At one point in time t, the fitted values from this regression are the predicted average forecast for the "average" forecaster based on the historical relationship between past forecasts and information in the public information set at the time past forecasts were made. Since all forecasters share the same public information set, the fitted value of equation (1) at each point in time is identical for all forecasters. The residual is from two sources. One source is specific to the forecaster. A forecaster may have private information. A forecaster may be an inflation optimist or pessimist. The second source hits all the forecasters at time t. In this study if all forecasters reduce their forecasts in response to the policy announcement, then actual forecasts would be lower than predicted from the past historical relationship between past forecasts and past public information. In this case the coefficient on the ANNOUNCE, the time dummy to coincide with the announcement period, would be statistically significant. The announcement coincides in timing with a change in expectations of inflation held by all forecasters which is not explained by changes in the other variables in the regression which had explained variation in past forecasts. 14 The dummy variables are introduced both in the forecast immediately after the announcement and in the next forecast after the announcement to allow for a lagged effect. The coefficients on the dummy variables are reported in Tables 6, 7 , and 8. Estimates are carried out with an Ordinary Least Squares regression of (1). Standard errors on the coefficients are reported after using White's (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity.
Several measures of expected inflation and its change are constructed from the survey. Recall that the surveys ask for expected inflation in the current calendar year and the next calendar year at different times over the calendar year. Endnote 6 discussed the dating of the forecasts and the information available on the price level at each forecast point. Table  3 presents seven measures of expected inflation, five of its level and three of its rate of change, constructed or available from the survey. The survey asks for expected inflation in the current year and the next calendar year, denoted π cy , and π ny . The current-year response includes information, more as the year goes on, about actual inflation in the current calendar year. 15 With knowledge of actual inflation in the current calendar year to date as known by the forecaster and the survey response, π cy , π c is constructed as the expected rate of inflation over the rest of the current calendar year. π c is combined with π ny to produce π 12 , the level of expected inflation over the next 12 months. This is an attempt to generate a constant horizon measure of expected inflation that does not otherwise exist in the survey data. To construct π 12 the assumption is made that the forecast of next year's inflation is evenly distributed over the 12 months of the next calendar year. 16 Finally π c and π ny are combined to produce π lt . π lt is the expected level of expected inflation over the longest time horizon possible given the survey data. The longest possible forecast horizon varies from 24 months at the beginning of the current calendar year to as little as 13 months at the end of the current calendar year for the CPI measure. All measures are expressed at annualized rates in the regression.
Three measures of the expected change in inflation used as the dependent variable in equation (1) are also outlined in Table 3 : the change in inflation expected from the last 12 months actually observed to the next 12 months in the forecast, the change in inflation from the last 12 months actually observed to the longest feasible time horizon, and the expected change in inflation from this calendar year to the next. The last measure is directly from the survey. π lt Expected inflation, over the longest time period responded to by the forecaster. This variable is a weighted average of π 12 and π ny where the weights do vary by month of the year. The forecast horizon also varies by month of the year. At the beginning of the current year the horizon is 24 months, at the end of the current year the horizon is 14 months for the CPI and 18 months for the deflator.
Changes in Expected Inflation
(π 12 -π a12 ) The expected change in inflation from the last observed 12 months to the next 12 months.
(π ny -π cy ) The expected change in inflation between the current calendar year and the next calendar year (directly from survey response).
(π lt -π a12 ) The expected change in the rate of inflation between the last 12 months and the longest horizon available.
None of the measures of expected inflation is perfect. The ideal measure would extend out to the length of time of the targets, up to three years, or at least to the usual period of effective monetary policy. The latter period is certainly longer than the 12 months (or less) which is explicit or implicit in some of the measures above. However given that inflation is relatively slow to change, information about the expected level of inflation or its change over the available horizons is useful information about expected inflation in the longer run. All of the constructed measures make assumptions about the common information available to and used by individual forecasters and assume that forecasters use revised data rather than the data as announced. These revisions were discussed in endnote 15. There is some noise introduced into the data by these assumptions. With this in mind, the effects of the policy announcements is now measured.
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF POLICY AND POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS ON EXPECTED INFLATION
The results of estimating a base regression for the level of expected inflation are presented in Table 4 . The left-hand side of Tables 4 and 5 is the entire period from 1975 to 1995 excluding the special dates around the policy announcements of interest, a total of about 700 separate forecasts over the 20 years. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the relationships between forecasts made over the entire sample and the public information available at the time the forecast was made. It is important to emphasize that these tables do not represent the estimates used in the analysis of a particular policy announcement. The effect of each policy announcement is analyzed conditional on the information forecasters would have had at the time of the announcement. Rather Tables 4 and 5 give the reader the opportunity to consider whether they believe the public information set I selected from all possible public information sets can play its required role in the analysis. The public information set controls for the effects of other factors that affect expected inflation and allows the effects of the announcement to be isolated by looking for a shift in the level of expected inflation not accounted for by changes in these variables.
The high R 2 in Table 4 simply means that the public information on the right-hand side of expression (1) does a good job in predicting variation in forecasts. It is not surprising that past actual inflation explains inflation forecasts well, what forecasters expect is what they have just seen. The length of lag was determined entirely by statistical significance, the GDP deflator equation goes back five years, the CPI equation goes back only three years. The last two years in the deflator equation have small coefficients. The difference between the average of the last group of forecasts and the most recent observation of inflation is statistically significant in three of six CPI equations, the negative sign says forecasters do alter their forecasts in response to the information in the recently observed inflation rate relative to the average of the last forecasts. There is no effect in the deflator equation for this variable. The bank rate and exchange rate variables also have little quantitative significance. Using the deflator or the CPI measure of inflation a 1 percent depreciation over the last 12 months does raise expected inflation but only by .01-.02 percent given the other variables in (1). An increase in the bank rate is associated with a decline in the level of expected CPI inflation and an increase in deflator inflation. Only the last three public information variables have large effects. An increase of 1 percent in the spread between Canadian and US interest rate reduces expected inflation in the CPI by .3 percent and, for some unknown reason, increases expected inflation in the deflator measure by about .1 percent. An increase in the slope of the yield curve of 1 percent decreases expected inflation by .1 to .3 percent over all measures. Finally the unemployment rate is clearly the most important public information variable. A 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate between the previous 12 months and the 12 months prior reduces the average forecast of inflation by an average of .3 percent over the 8 measures of the level of inflation forecast. Equation (1) indicates that movements in policy variables do not shift expected inflation much over the survey horizon. Forecasters wait until unemployment has risen and actual inflation has fallen.
An increase in unemployment is also the key variable in Table 5 . Table 5 shows the effect of similar public information variables on the expected change in inflation between now and the future. A negative value of the dependent variable indicates a decline in inflation is expected, a positive value is an increase in expected inflation. An increase in the level of the bank rate produces a decline in expected inflation. The effect is modest in size, a 1 percent higher average bank rate in the previous 12 months produces an expected decline in inflation of about .1 percent. The exchange rate variable again behaves oddly, an exchange rate depreciation in the last 12 months generates an increase in the expected inflation rate as measured by the deflator but a decrease in the expected inflation over the immediate past as measured by consumer prices. The latter effect is not statistically significant. Neither effect is large. The interest rate spread performs according to priors in the CPI regression, an increase in the spread reduces expected inflation relative to the immediate past in two of three cases. The spread variable has no significant effect in the deflator equation. The term structure variable is also only significant in the CPI equation. The difference between the average of the last group of forecasts and the most recently observed inflation rate has a positive sign and is significant in three of six cases. If the most recent average forecast of inflation is larger than the actual inflation rate most recently observed, the difference variable is positive. When this variable is positive, forecasters expect that future inflation will increase relative to its immediate past so that their previous forecast will become true. The INFLATION LAGGED variables in this regression are the changes of inflation rates just observed. A positive observation in this variable means inflation, measured at an annualized rate between that month or quarter and the previous month or quarter, is increasing. Eight months of the most recent observations of the CPI are used to construct the seven lagged values of this variable in the CPI equation. In Table  5 , none of the values for INFLATION LAGGED in the CPI regression are significant. In some of the sub-samples used to estimate the effects of the announcements INFLATION LAGGED is significant. Increases in the rate of inflation measured by recent quarterly observations of the GDP deflator clearly contribute to an expected increase in the rate of deflator inflation in Table 5 . The lower R 2 in the inflation-change equations relative to the level equations is not surprising. It is much more difficult to predict what the forecasters believe about the expected change in inflation than its level. Table 6 measures the impact of the Crow speeches in the spring of 1988. Dummy variables are introduced for the forecast in March 1988, the forecast immediately after the Hanson Lecture in January. A second dummy is added for forecasts made in July 1988 after further and even more emphatic speeches by Crow emphasizing price stability. It is important that these equations are estimated using data only to the end of July 1988. This partly controls for instability in the coefficients of the base equation and uses the public information set forecasters had up to the time of the announcement. 17 As already emphasized the results are conditional on the assumption that the goal of price stability enunciated so clearly in the speeches was a surprise. Table 6 reveals that in the period of the speeches the level of expected inflation did fall after controlling for the state of the economy, past inflation, and the most recent policy actions taken. These speech effects are of economic significance as well, the average impact effect in March 1988 over the eight measures is a .66 percent decline in the level of inflation. There is an even larger effect on the level of expected inflation in the July 1988 forecast. This result suggests strongly that the repetition of the governor's low inflation message was useful. Table 6 also presents estimates of the coefficient on a joint dummy for March 1988 and July 1988; in all but two cases the coefficient is negative and significant. It should be recalled that, although the speeches appear "effective" at reducing expected inflation, there was little change in actual inflation from 1988 to 1989 and the forecasts were essentially correct. Thus although the speeches are associated with lower expected inflation, other factors in 1988 must have indicated an increase in expected inflation according to previous history. The main factor was a substantial decline in the unemployment rate. The two factors roughly offset each other. This situation changes drastically in 1991 where actual inflation declines more rapidly than forecasted inflation and inflation targets are introduced.
Inflation targets were announced on 26 February 1991. Dummies associated with their effect are introduced into equation (1) in March 1991 and July 1991 (separately and together). A negative coefficient on these dummies would indicate that the level of expected inflation fell when targets were introduced after controlling for changes in the other variables in the regression. The sample is all forecasts made from 1975 to January 1992. Thus any information in the 1988 speeches is incorporated into the coefficients on expression (1) and the announcement Expected Inflation in Canada 1988 Canada -1995 3. Sample is to July 1988 for both CPI and deflator-based regressions. 4. A negative value on the dummy variable indicates that the speeches in the spring of 1988 coincided with an unexplained fall in the level of expected inflation or an expected decline in inflation from the known past to the future. 5. Dependent variables are defined in Table 4 . 6. Units are expressed as annual percentages, that is, in March 1988, there was a .07 percent decline in the expected level of CPI-based inflation in the current year not explained by the other variables in the base regression.
dummies represent the additional impact of the targets announcement. One difficulty with the examination of 1991 is the introduction of the federal Goods and Services Tax (GST). The GST was implemented (with a full year's warning) on 1 January 1991. The GST caused and was expected to cause a one-time jump in the Consumer Price Index for any measure of inflation which includes the change in the price level from December 1990 to January 1991. Although the effect of the GST on the deflator measure of inflation is likely smaller, the same effect may occur for any measure of deflator inflation which includes the period from Quarter Four 1990 to Quarter One 1991. For the variables which measure the expected change in inflation, when the GST is due within the forecast horizon, expected inflation will increase, when the GST has occurred in the last 12 months of observed inflation, expected inflation will decrease.
Consider the following example. All forecast measures of the level of inflation which include 1991 as the current year are higher with the GST, this would include all four forecasts of current-year inflation in 1991. Similarly all four forecasts of nextyear inflation made in 1990 would be higher due to the GST effects. And the change in inflation from current year to next year would be higher in 1990 and lower in 1991 due to the GST effect. Similar statements can be made for the 12-month-ahead and long-term inflation forecasts. When equation (1) is estimated for this event, GST dummies are added to the appropriate forecasts to separate the announcement effects from the GST effects. 18 The estimates in Table 7 use data to the forecast of January 1992. This may slightly overstate the information actually available to forecasters but allows the effects of inflation targets to be more clearly separated from the GST effects. Table 7 presents estimates of the coefficients on the dummy variables in March 1991, in July 1991, and in both March and July of 1991. A negative coefficient on these dummy variables would indicate that the periods immediately after the announcement of targets were periods where expected inflation fell in a way unexplained by the other variables in the base regression. Table 7 does not suggest an important role for the announcement of targets. The coefficient on the March 1991 dummy is negative and significant in two of four regressions involving the level of the Consumer Price Index inflation. However the effect does not persist into July 1991. The coefficient on the joint dummy variable for March and July is negative and significant in one case. The coefficients on the dummies that correspond to the introduction of targets in equations for the forecasts of deflator inflation or the change in expected inflation measured by either the CPI or the GDP deflator find that the period of the introduction of targets was a period where expected inflation typically increased after the state of the economy was taken into account.
It is important to reiterate that Table 1 shows the targets were credible. But the analysis in Table 7 does not find the introduction of targets led to a clearly defined reduction in expected inflation that cannot be explained by other factors. It is not entirely surprising that the targets had little direct impact on expected inflation as measured in the survey. The horizon of the first target was at the very end of the forecast period and the actual inflation rate just observed when targets were announced was close to the target rate. The targets were not very ambitious. More interesting results are obtained in considering the effects around the revision of targets and the replacement of Governor Crow. percent inflation in 1995 there would be "further progress" toward price stability. This apparent modification of the goal of monetary policy suggested there would be no further short-term efforts to reduce the rate of inflation; actual inflation and expected inflation were already less than 3 percent in 1993. In Table 8 three dummy variables, for forecasts in January 1994 , March 1994 , and July 1994 are placed in equation (1) to try to capture the effects of the 23 December 1993 announcement. It seems unlikely that the revision in targets would have much effect in the January 1994 forecast. 19 These dummies are tested in combinations, that is, separately, one for all three forecast months, as well as a dummy for the pair of forecasts in March and July 1994. Table 8 uses data to the March 1995 forecast. Although this once again gives the forecasters slightly more information than they would have had, the extra observations are necessary to separate the effects of the announcement from another significant tax complication.
In January 1994 both federal and provincial governments reduced tobacco taxes significantly. This decrease was unexpected and reduced the level of the Consumer Price Index from January to February substantially. 20 Once again, because indirect taxes are not included directly in the calculation of the deflator, tax issues are less important in the deflator regressions. After the tax cuts were announced, the level of expected inflation in the current year would fall, that is, for forecasts in March, July, and September 1994. So dummy variables to capture the effects of the tax cuts must be placed in the relevant regression. This is true for a variety of the regressions estimating the level of expected inflation or the expected change in inflation. These dummies are added to the relevant equations to isolate the announcement effects from the tax effects. Table 8 presents estimates of the coefficients on the December 23 announcement dummy variables. The results suggest that the December 1993 announcement did play some role in reducing expectations of inflation. There are some effects even on the January forecasts, forecasts made before the tobacco tax cut. There are substantial effects on the March forecast, so large that there is some suspicion of confusion with the tax effects. 21 And there are some effects on the dummies estimated for all three periods and for the latter two periods.
A reasonable interpretation of the negative signs scattered throughout Table 8 is that expected inflation remained stable when various economic and policy indicators suggested an increase in expected inflation would have occurred. In particular the unemployment rate finally started to decrease and the interest rate spread between Canada and the United States fell by 1.5 percent. Even with this public data, forecasts of inflation did not rise and in fact continued to fall. Table 8 points to a situation in which the Bank of Canada successfully managed the transition to looser monetary policy and the appointment of a new governor without increasing expected inflation. The combination of continuing explicit inflation targets and the appointment of an internal candidate for governor stabilized expected inflation when the future of Bank of Canada policy had been uncertain.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has two objectives. It documents the fact that, using survey-based measures of expected inflation, there was substantial unexpected disinflation following the 1990-91 recession in Canada. The disinflation was unexpected in spite of significant attempts by the Bank of Canada from January 1988 onwards to clarify the objectives of monetary policy. This is the discouraging news. It appears to be difficult to fully shift expected inflation with policy announcements. However there is also some encouraging news. There is some descriptive evidence that clearer policy announcements did shorten the period of unexpected disinflation and reduce the magnitude of unexpected disinflation after 1988. This evidence is obtained by comparing the behaviour of unexpected disinflation after the 1982 recession and after the 1991 recession. There is some direct evidence that the speeches by Governor Crow during 1988 did have the desired effect on expected inflation. Unexpected disinflation after the 1990-91 recession could have been much larger had the governor not chosen to make the goal of monetary policy as clear as possible. This suggests that Governor Crow did acquire some credibility during and after 1988. When inflation targets were announced in 1991 they were clearly credible. Although the 1991 announcement of inflation targets had little effect on the level of expected inflation in the relatively short horizon measured in the survey, the revision of inflation targets and the transition to a new governor in 1993 were handled in such a way that expected inflation continued to fall. This is indirect evidence that inflation targets are a useful policy device and the Bank did, in 1993, "successfully" manage the formation of expected inflation through the appointment of the new governor.
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I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant Number 410-93-1409) and the Research Office at Wilfrid Laurier University for financial assistance. I would also like to thank Dr. Jim Frank of the Conference Board and Bill Robson of the C.D. Howe Institute for providing the survey data on expected inflation. Helpful comments were received at the 1995 meetings of the Canadian Economics Association, at a presentation at the Bank of Canada, and from the referees and editors. Grant Kelly and Gidio Mascaro provided research assistance. survey in the United States asks participants in financial markets for their forecasts of the price level 6 and 12 months out. Carlson (1977) first asks if this measure of expected inflation is rational. Although this survey has been studied many times since then, the evidence on its rationality remains unclear. Keane and Runkle (1990) study the NBER-ASA survey of professional forecasters and conclude that this group produces a rational forecast of inflation. The Conference Board participants are the Canadian equivalent of the ASA-NBER group. Holden and Peel (1986) study a British survey of professional forecasters and conclude their forecasts are useful assessments of expected inflation.
A second controversy is over the extent to which professional forecasters represent expectations of other economic agents in society. There is more limited evidence on this issue. In the United States consumers are asked questions related to expected inflation by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. A measure of expected inflation can be constructed from the answers. (This process varies by year and exact question.) Bryan and Gavin (1986) , Gramlich (1983) , Rich (1989) , and Smyth (1992) all claim that the surveys of consumers and the surveys of professional forecasters both contain useful information and that a direct comparison of surveys of economists and surveys of consumers yields a similar answer. There is no similar survey of consumers in Canada. The data on expected inflation provided in surveys of professional forecasters is the only source of direct expectations of inflation over this period. Deaves (1994) and Campbell and Murphy (1996) both find Canadian survey data provides useful information. Ragan (1995) prefers not to use survey data to infer expected inflation; he feels there is insufficient reason to believe respondents will put effort into the accuracy of their responses. Laxton, Rose and Tetlow (1993) use the Canadian survey as a direct measure of expected inflation in estimating the Phillips curve. 4 This is the longest running survey of this type in Canada. Economic Forecasts: A Monthly Worldwide Survey contains Canadian data since 1984. The two surveys ask a similar question to a similar and overlapping group of forecasters. The Conference Board survey has a few more respondents. There is some "direct" data on expected inflation in comparing the yields on indexed Canadian government bonds to the yields on nominal bonds. Such bonds have been issued only since 1991. 5 The GDP deflators are released with the National Accounts on 1 March (Fourth Quarter previous year), 20 June (revisions to the previous year releases and Quarter One of the current year), 1 September (Quarter Two current year) and 1 December (Quarter Three current year). As noted above the survey is conducted to allow forecasters to use this information. I assume forecasts are made with information available 1 January (the December forecast), 1 March, 1 July, and 1 September. The first assumption aligns the forecasts into the correct "current year" but may slightly overstate the data available to forecasters depending on the time in December of the CPI announcement relative to the production of the forecast. In all other cases, the information available to forecasters is understated. The Consumer Price Index for the previous month is released in the second or third week of the current month, that is, in January a forecaster learns the value of the December Consumer Price Index. 6 Campbell and Murphy (1996) use Conference Board data with the forecasters identified by name to run a "horserace" and identify the "best" forecaster. This reduces the number of observations per period substantially if you want each forecaster to participate in every period. Creating a true panel was not necessary for my purposes and would substantially reduce the number of available observations. 7 Keane and Runkle (1990) discuss the interpretation of forecast errors from a group of forecasters in some detail. They argue that the average forecast error may be statistically different from zero in a given period (or even in a series of periods) while forecasters were individually "rational" because at specific times an entire group of forecasters may be hit by a common "shock." The issue of rationality can only be addressed by taking the average forecast error over a large number of periods which presumably incorporates both positive and negative common shocks. This is done in Tables 1 and 2. 14 A second way to think about the regression estimated is that, with the policy announcement, the forecasters join a "treatment" group. The dummy tests whether the treatment induces a shift in the level of expected inflation holding other factors equal as indicated in the historical relationship. In a true "treatment" setting, some forecasters would hear the policy announcement and the others would not. This is not possible in an economic experiment. 15 For example as of September, 17/24 of the information on actual inflation necessary to "forecast" current year CPI and 6/8 of the information needed to forecast the GDP deflator measure of inflation is known with certainty (up to any revisions). There are no significant revisions in the CPI. A five-year study (1989 to 1994) of deflator releases and revisions revealed the largest revision to be .3 units on 125 units or .24 percent. Most revisions were much smaller. The study ignores the issue of revisions to the deflator and uses the CANSIM historical data as the actuals. 16 In contrast, the Livingston survey in the United States asks participants for the expected level of the Consumer Price Index six months later. In using this survey the researcher has to infer the start value of the CPI known by survey participants. To use the Conference Board survey the researcher has to infer the amount of actual inflation observed by the survey respondent. The problems are similar. 17 As clearly revealed by Chow tests, the base equations estimated for the full sample in Tables 4 and 5 are not stable over time. You would not expect this equation to be stable over time. Although the base equations (1) have good explanatory power at all sub-periods, the sign and statistical significance of the bank rate and exchange rate variables vary over time. However the coefficients on the term structure slope, spread, and especially the unemployment variable are of consistent economic and statistical significance. In all samples the lagged inflation variables are the dominant explanatory variables on the level of expected inflation. Estimating (1) up to July 1988 gives forecasters access to the historical past they would have had. This is the appropriate sample in which to look for the effects of a level shift in expected inflation from the speeches.
